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IN THE SUPREI\JIE COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

DOUGLAS CHARLES· PETERSON,

7757

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Salt Lake, against the above named defendant; the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge.
The defendant was infor1ned against by the District
Attorney of the Third Judicial District by an infornla. tion and accused of the cri1nes of BURGLARY IN THE
I
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SECOND DEGREE and GRAND LARCENCY, TO
WIT: that the· defendant on or about March 25, 1951,
* * * entered the building of Clarence L. 1\1eans in the
night time with intent to commit larceny therein; and
that the defendant on or about March 25, 1951, stole
from Clarence L. Means personal property having a
value in excess of $50.00, lawful money of the United
States. The cas.e was tried before a jury June 13, 1951,
and a verdict was returned as follows:
"We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case,
find the defendant guilty of the crime of Grand
Larceny as charged in the Information, and not
guilty of the crime of B-q.rglary in the S.econd
Degree.''
THE EVIDENCE
CLARENCE L. MEANS, the complainant, 'vas
owner of Torch Tavern, at 477 South Main, front entrance on Main, with driveway running back of building
from 5th South; at back of building is a door with window south of it. He closed his business at 1 A.l\L
March 25 and checked doors and windows. Pursuant
to visit of a policeman later, he went to the tavern and
saw one back door, leading from toilet, partly open, and
a back window with a small square broken out; and he
observed a television set, electric drill and other property had been taken; next saw articles about 6 A.M.
Sunday at police station. (Tr. 3-12) Means had known
defendant for 4 or 5 years, but had not seen him for
2
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about 1 year. ( Tr. 1~~-l~~) The big windovv in \Yhich
a pane 'vns broken is barred, but in judgment of witness
afforded sufficient protection inasmuch as a person
could not cra,vl bet1veen the bars; (Tr. 17-18) bars about
8 or 10 inches apart; the door in back was open in the
morning- it had been locked on inside and nailed. (Tr.
19) Means did not knovv Charles ~f. Olmsted. (Tr. 24)
DANIEL .L~. DUN testified that he and Edward
Peterson, after being at Dee's Hamburger at about 3 :30
A. M., were standing talking on 5th South and east of
The Torch, he observed a car drive out of parking lot
east of The Torch, turn right and go West; .rear door
was open but went shut; trunk lid partly up; some
object in trunk. They v;ent back to investigate; observed
window broken and rear door partly open ; called police
about 3 :55; waited until officers Clayton and Olsen
arrived at 4:00. (Tr. 32-36) He did not see anyone
in car; watched it to at least vVest Temple. (Tr. 27)
EDWARD PETERSON, testified that early morning of March 25 he a:hd Dan Dun walked north on .
Main past The Torch; he heard son1ething fall in The
Torch but thought it was the janitor; when they came
back and were standing talking he saw a car drive from
driveway over sidewalk at too fast ~ rate of speed;
he did not pay much attention to car; only saw license
number, which he detected v1as 484; the trunk lid was
up; it appeared to him there was a safe in the back
of the car; looked like two in the car; \vent west on
3
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5th South at a high rate of speed; he and Dun \vent to
The Torch tavern and saw a window broken and a door
partly op·en. Dun called the police between ,3 :30 and
4 :00; officers came later; he did not know if occupants
were male or female. (Tr. 54-57)
JACI{ MERRICK, special officer on duty along
5th West Street early morning of March 25 near corner
of 2nd South; saw a car going north; trunk open about
a foot, black objeet sticking out; he fell in behind, gave
chase to almost North Temple and 5th West ; lead car
made left turn into alley ·at 49 N. 5th West; two n1en
jumped out; witness followed driver through field or
alley and overtook him; asked by officer what was in
car man told him a television set he obtained from a . .
friend after a fight; man then ran away north; witness
phoned the police dispatcher 4 :04; between 8 to 10 minutes after witness had first seen the car; witness identified man in court as defendant; witness with other
officeTs went to pursued car and did some checking on
articles in car. He testified the pursued car made a
turn into a narrow driveway for about half block from ·
sidewalk which led into a place where there are all kinds
of shacks and a lot of rubbish. (Tr. 76-76) It was dark
back· tliere, no lights; witness fired 'tvvo shots; man came
back; witness did not identify man, but man said his
name Chuck or Chick Peterson and the man with him
was Kenny S-olomon; witness did not see man again for
few days in county jail; he reported name man told hiin
4
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and sa"~ ~~o1ne pictures of hi1n; n1an pursued had levis
and a blue striped shirt on; I·~aster n1orni.ng and no
coat on or Y~~itll hiln. (Tr. 7G-S~1) On redirect: there
were arc lights and sign light, and witness had flash
light at n1an's face so he could readily observe features.
(Tr. 83)

nl. L. HUNSAI(ER, police officer on duty early
hours of ~:larch 25; about 4 o'clock received call to
look for a car, make not positive; numbers ori license
484; 8 or 10 minutes later call from Officer Merrick
came; went to Merrick, saw car with nun1bers 484 on
license; they checked some articles in car; witness took
Pontiac to Headquarters, keys \vere in car; witness
identified articles taken from car and -exhibit "E" as a
list. (Tr. 84-90) On cross: the television was dusted
for prints; he never saw any; never saw defendant until
preliminary hearing. (Tr. 93)
11. W ..OLSON, police officer, in early hours of
1iarch 25 went to Torch Tavern and made examination
of broken window, and bars; said bars vv-ere sufficiently
far apart so a person could get thru them; purpose was
to deterrlline means of entry, but made no measurement
of space between bars; opined defendant could go thru
bars; he checked windows for way of opening, but did
not rep·ort anything on that, nor if they went thru the
bars. (Tr. 94-98)
DOUGLAS. CHARLES PETERSON, the defend-

ant, on evening of J.\IIarch 24 was home 'vith wife and
5
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four children at 69 North 5th West; wife had not been
out for long time, and he secured his Grandmother to
take over the children and he and his wife ·left home
about 10 o'clock and went to Airpo'rt Gardens at North
Temple about 30th West; drove out in 1939 Dodge
Coupe·; they danced and defendant played in band; left
about 1 :15 A.M. Sunday, had trouble getting car started;
went directly home-about 15 minute drive; the 1941
Pontiac was missing from back yard-it was there when
they left; he had been dickering with Charles Olmsted·
on transfer of Dodge to Olmsted, and had let the latter
drive the car; defendant and wife went in their house,
and defendant walked Grandmother (Clara ·Turner)
home; went back, and he and wife went to bed. It was
about 2 o'clock. (Tr. 99-103)
After going to bed they were awakened by phone;
it was Olmsted who called. Witness here attempted to
relate convers~tion on phone when State objected on
ground of hearsay. MR. L UNT (defense counsel) :
"Now, if the Court please, I think we have a chance to
go into this matter at this time. Mr. Obnsted was
charged and has not been apprehended for this crime,
and I think we have a right to go into the whole business.." (Tr. 103) The State withdrew its objection to
permit of testimony as to the whole occurrence. (Tr.
109) And defendant then testified to the effect: (Tr. 110)
that Olmsted said he had defendant's Pontiac and asked
defendant to hurry over to 5th West between 2nd and
6
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3rd South-that it 'Yas ilnportant; that defendant hurriedly put on pants, shoes and shirt 'vithout buttoning
shirt, and rru1 over to designated place. There was the
Pontiac; first tin1e he had seen it after leaving home
about 10 preYious evening. Olmsted approached car,
and defendant having seen trunk open asked what 'vas
in it. Being told by Olmsted 'vhat, and how he obtained
the property, defendant told him to get stuff out right
now,-to get rid of it; that defendant would have no
part of it. Because of condition of car it had stopped
on Olmsted, and after some trouble they started; defendant jumped in car and was going to get off over
home. (Tr. 110-112) Defendant intended getting off at
front of house, but Olmsted turned down drive,vay;
saw car con1ing about llf2 blocks away; it pulled in
behind; Olmsted turned key off, jumped out and hollered~
"Run, Pete." D-efendant, being scared and panicky,
and by influence of suggestion, jumped and ran; defend··
ant had been fast asleep when property was .stolen;
they ran together through the field, defendant behind;
defendant then thought, what reason did he have to
run, stopped and started back to the officer; defendant's
shirt tail was out and shirt unbuttoned,-had no intention of taking shirt off; he had been 40 to 50 feet in
lead of officer and could have run behind some houses,
but went back to officer and car. Officer asked what
was in back of car, and defendant said a television set,
and related,-"This friend of mine got it, went down to
son1e people's houses, and it is his television." Then
7
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they walked to Salt Lake

~filling

door, about. 20 to 25

feet from driveway where defendant lived; the officer,
about 10 feet behind, stopped to awaken night•.vatch and
call police, and defendant continued walking right into
his house; told his wife what had happened, and sat
there about lj2 hour. (Tr. 112-114)

Defendant about 5

o'clock walked over to Grandmother's, about a ·block
away; his wife and Ohnsted came over later; defendant
complained to Olmsted about what happened, and at
that time Olmsted wrote, in presence of Grandmother,
defendant and his wife, on his driver's license and signed
his name, which writing was identified as defendant
exhibit 1, and gave it to defendant, \vho in turn ga':e
it to !{r. Blazzard of Police department, when defendant went to police department folJowing Tuesday at
8 :00 A.!{. and related the events. Defendallt denies
he was in, near or by the Torch Tavern on the morning
of !farch 25, 1951, and denied the burglary. At a recess
defendant n1easured the bars on the Torch Tavern window which had been broken; the window is 42 inches
wide, bars about 1 inch thick and 8 bars between ends.
(Tr. 114-120) On cross, defendant denied any mention
of Kenny Solomon, or that he gave the address of 553
Jeremy Ave. Asked if he had ever been convicted of a
felony and he answered, "yes"; Q. What were they~
A. One was in 1947 for grand larceny, and I was convicted again in 1949 or 1950 for unlawful sale of Government property. (Tr. 122-124)
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\VIL~IA

PETERSON, 'yife of defendant, related

going to Airport Gardens about 10 o'clock; Pontiac there
when they left, but gone on return; defendant walked
home 'Yith Grandn1other, and in short time came back,
and both went to bed; the phone rang and wife handed
it to defendant, and she heard him talk on phone; then
defendant grabbed his pants and stuff and said he had
to run over to 5th West and 2nd South; shortly defendant came back in and then left for Grandmother's, leaving word if Olmsted came to bring him over; later Olmsted came, and she and he went over to Grandmother's;
she saw Olmsted write and sign his name, and read what
was written. (Tr. 126-128)
CLARA TURNER, the grandmother of defendant,
testified she 'vent over to Peterson home; defendant and
wife left about 10 o'clock; returned about 1 or later;
defendant mentioned about car being gone; he walked
her home and went back home; later defendant, his wife
and Olmsted were at her place; she saw Olmsted write
and sign his name. (Tr. 128-132)
Defendant offered exhibit 1 which was objected to
as hearsay and self serving; objection sustained. (Tr.
132) No objections (exceptions) to Court's instructions
by defense. ( Tr. 133)
The instructions given by the Court appear in the
Record on Appeal, pages 16 to 28.
9
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. The rrrial Court erred in sustaining objections to
defendant's proposed exhibit 1, for the reason that the
written confession of Charles Olmsted "\Vas a sequence
to facts p,roved which had an inherent te:~:dency to connect said Olmsted with the actual corn1nission of the
crime. (Tr. 132)
2. The Court erred in not instructing the jury at
the close of the evidence to return a verdict of acquittal
on both charges and included offenses; (Instr. Record
16-28) for the reason that the evidence is such that
reasonable men carinot differ upon the fact that it
includes a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the
defendant; and such was a matter of law for the Court.
3. The verdict of the jury is contrary to law and
the evidence.
4. The Court erred in not instructing the jury circumscribing their consideration of the cross examination of the defendant as to conviction of a prior felony
to the matter and point of the credibility of the witness.

ARGUMENT

Assignment No. 1
. The Trial Court erred in sustaining objection to
defendant's proposed exhibit No. 1, for the reason that
the written confession of Charles Olmsted was a sequence
10
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to facts p::. oved \vhich h~.d an inherent tendency to connect said Ohnsted \vith the actual con1mission of the
crime.
There is nothing to refute the testimony of defendant and no conflict in the evidence, to the effect that it
\Yas Olmsted \Yho had the Pontiac license number 484,
and \Yhatever property there \vas in the car at the time
\\?hen defendant met him on 5th West and 2nd South
after the phone call to defendant's ho1ne; and the writing
on exhibit 1 came in such sequence as to be a part of the
res gestae. We believe the view is tenable and applicable in this case as set out in PEOPLE VS.. MENDEZ
(Cal.), 2~3 Pac. 64, (K 21) page 70:
". . . Confessions, threats, and circumstances of
flight on the part of third persons are all in the
nature of declarations or admissions of such third
persons, and are therefore hearsay, unless they
come within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. It does not seem to us that they may
be justly regarded as part of the res gestae
unless and until evidence is produced which has
an inherent tendecy to connect such pe.rsons with
the actual con~1nission of the crime.''
And this theory is further sustained by further observations herein on other assignments.
In GILDER VS. STATE (Tex. 1911), 133 S. W.
883, a conviction of burglal'Y was reveTsed because of
refusal of trial court to grant a continuance to allow
defendant an opportunity to have present some absent
II
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witnesses, one to prove confession of a third party. Said
the Court:
"By another one of the absent witnesses he
alleges he could have established the fact that the
witness. Smith admitted taking the guns. In other
words, he proposed to prove the confession of
Smith. His alibi and his statements as to how
he came in possession of the guns and the confession of Smith could be entirely in harmony
with every other charge, which would afford, if
the jury believed it, fully sufficient reasons why
they should not return a verdict against him . . .
should submit defense matters to the jury."
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 4th Ed.
Sec. 296:
. ''It frequently happens that the accused resorts to the defense that another committed the
crime, especially where the state's evidence is
circumstantial. Such evidence is generally held
admissible if relating to the res gestae, if guilt
of the other party is consistent with the innocence
of the defendant, and there are facts in evidence
pointing to the guilt of someone other than the
accused." Citing, PEOPLE VS. V ATEK, 71 Cal.
App. 453, 263 Pac. 163; STATE VS. CAVINEES,
40 Id. 500, 235 Pac. 890; and other cases."

Assignments No. 2 and 3
The Court erred in not instructing the jury at the
close of the evidence to return a verdict of acquittal
on both charges and included offenses for the reason
12
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that the evidence is such that reasonable men cannot
differ upon the fact that it includes a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the defendant, and such was a
n1atter of la"'" for the Court. And, that being so, the
verdict of the jury is contrary to laY\"' and the evidence.
There is no evidence, finger prints or otherwise,
that connects defendant 'vith any taking, receiving, aiding or abetting in the taking of the stolen property.
The circumstances established by the evidence are all to
the contrary. On the cold Easter morning he was out
'vith only an unbuttoned shirt on-no coat on or with
him. His running from the car can easily be perceived
as a spontaneous action under the circumstances without
the reflection of any guilty scienter ; and his return to
the officer and car when he could have run and hid
refutes the idea of a guilty conscience. As to defendant's
whereabouts 'vhen the breaking-in took place is established without refutation. Under the evidence any reasonable man can deduce the hypothesis of innocence of
the defendant:
In STATE VS. BURCH, 100 Utah 414, 115 Pac.
2nd 911, it is said :
"If circumstantial evidence is submitted to a
jury, it is accompanied by an instruction that to
convict upon such evidence, that evidence must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
... BUT IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUCH THAT
REASONABLE MEN WOULD NOT DIF·FER
UPON THE ·FACT THAT IT INCLUDES
13
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I

SUCH AN HYPOTHESIS, THEN IT IS NOT
A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, BUT IS ONE
FOR THE COURT." (Emphasis ours.
20 AM. JUR. 1060 :

" ... If the circumstances established are dependent one upon another, each rnust be consistent only with the theory of guilt in order that a
conviction may stand."
STATE VS. WELLS., 35 Utah, 400, 100 P. 691, 136
Al\I. ST. REP. 1059, 19 ANN CAS. 631:
". . . When a fact which is an essential element
to constitute a crime is sought to be proven by
circumstances alone, it is not enough that the
conclusions sought to be proven may be inferred
therefrom, but they must also be inconsistent with
every other reasonable conclusion." ( Straup)
To same effect is 16 C. J. 1011, S.ec. 2436.

Assignment No. 4
The Court erred in not instructing the jury circuinscribing their consideration of the cross examination
of the defendant as to conviction of a prior felony.
The rule is as stated in UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th Ed.), Sec. 140:
"The defendant may be questioned when he
becomes a witness in his own behalf concerning
specific acts in order to test his credibility of
his testimony. Thus his previous conviction of a
felony may be shown."
14
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16 C. J. 586, Par. 1132:
"The general rule is that, on a prosecution
for a particular crin1e, evidence which in any
manner shows or tends to show that accused has
committed another crilne 'vholly independent of
that for which he is on trial, even though it is a
crilne of the same sort, is irrelevant and inad. "ble ...,,
llllSSl
See also 16 C. J. 595, Sec. 1149.

It will be observed that the charge included two
offenses-burglary and grand larceny. If defendant were
guilty at all, he was guilty of burglary as well as grand
larceny, AND· the jury brought in a verdict of GRAND
LARCENY ALONE. Evidently the verdict was predicated upon the truthful statement of the defendant as
to a prior conviction, instead of having been limited by
a proper instruction as to the purpose of such crossexamination, which would have added credence to his
testimony, and entitled him to an acquittal. Certainly
defendant could not have be~n guilty of grand larceny
had he not been guilty of burglary in this instance, but
the grand larceny verdict only v¥as predicated upon the
cross· examination as to a prior convictio~ of grand
larceny.

CONCLUSI01~

We are not unmindful of the general rule of practice
that this Court reviews only those matters that come
IS
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before it whereon exceptions and objections have been
taken in the Court below according to technical formal
procedure. After all, we believe, this Court is not sitting
as an umpire rating the scores of legal strategists, but
rather the umpire to determine and grant legal rights
of the citizens who come before it. And -vv. . e predicate this
belief upon the expressions of this Court in STATE VS.
COBO, ______ Utah ______ , 60 Pac. 2nd. 952, v1here the court
said at page 958 :
" ... In these days of 'videspread advocacy of
reformed procedure in crin1inal cases to heal and
cure misgivings and faulty prosecutions, the
safeguards of the rights and privileges of the
accused should not be overlooked and a loose
rein held for the prosecution and a tight, technical, and restricted rein held on the accused."
This Court in STATE VS. COBO, supra, cites ample
authority for the application of the exception to the general rule in view of the record and transcript submitted
on this appeal.
If a person can be convicted on the .evidence in this
case, being out on parole, on the basis of his prior conviction, without proper instructions relative to cross
examination as to prior convictions circumscribing the
consideration of the jury as to such examination, then
we are going far fetched from the purpose of per1nitting
cross examination as to prior convictions. We will then,
as perhaps- in this case 'vas done, convict a parolee on no
other grounds than that he told the truth. This is a
16
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point of serious concern in this particular case, and '\Ve
urge consideration on the part of this Court..
Respectfully subn1itted,
EKsAYN ANDERSON

P. N.

and

ANDERSON,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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